Prologue
Verbatim statements from the commanding officer’s official Patrol Report are in the paragraphs commencing with times in bold face (date/times underlined). Other commentaries are based on direct quotes and recollections provided by former members of the crew, many of whom are named in this narrative.
The editors of the Gunnel story are James M. Lavelle, the originator of the
project, and Lloyd R."Joe" Vasey who was an officer on this submarine
during the first five war patrols. He has contributed essential background
information to put the story in context and elaborated on the commanding
officer’s remarks in many instances. Extensive research of the historical
records and navigational charts has been made to insure the faithfulness of
Gunnel’s story. However, the editors take full responsibility for any omissions
or inaccuracies. We would welcome your comments, and especially encourage
relevant submissions from former crew members and their families, and most
specifically, remembrances of Jim’s father Torpedoman James Lavelle, who served
in the after torpedo room on several patrols. This work continues in progress.
Please note our frequent reference to the commanding officer as, "the Captain" -- capitalized for emphasis, and respect. The commanding officer of any US Navy ship under command of a commissioned officer is traditionally called "captain", regardless of rank, in this case John S.McCain Jr.was a Lt. Commander at the time. Each commanding officer in the Navy is charged with the ultimate responsibility and accountability for the safety and operations of his ship and crew. The demands and hazards of wartime operations placed an awesome responsibility on a submarine "skipper" – sailing under sealed orders, the only eye at the periscope, more often than not the only person aboard with the total picture at his finger tips. A vital lesson learned by submarine crews was the need to place unquestioning faith in the judgment, skill and valor of "the old man", as he was affectionately called when out of earshot.
Yet each commanding officer knew that his "boat" had one great strength which he depended upon: the enlisted men and junior officers. Volunteers and the cream of the fleet, professionally competent, dedicated and courageous – all are heroes in the Gunnel story, iron men in a steel boat.
"On the strength of one
link in the cable,
Dependeth the might
of the chain.
Who knows when thou mayest be tested ?
So live that thou
bearest the strain."
(From:
Naval Customs, Traditions and Usage)
View looking aft as the GUNNEL sails down the Thames River with the Grotton Bridge just barely visible in the distance. |
On May 18, 1943 the GUNNEL arrived in Pearl
Harbor Hawaii after the long passage from New London, Connecticut via the
Panama Canal. The Liberty Card at right was issued to James M. Lavelle on
3/23/43 shortly before the Gunnel left for the Pacific. It would be almost 2
1/2 years before he would need a New London liberty pass again.
The trip from New London to Panama had been
rather uneventful, but always hazardous in view of the intensive German U-boat
offensive underway against allied shipping off the East coast and in the
Caribbean. Frequent American anti-submarine air patrols were encountered, and
Gunnel’s crew, mindful of the attacks on the sub by friendly forces during the
first patrol in the North African – European theatre were extremely vigilant
and the skipper ordered extra lookouts assigned to the bridge watch while the
boat was running surfaced. The transit was made mostly on the surface for extra
speed, and friendly forces advised by radio from Fleet headquarters of the
boats pre-planned courses and speeds. Such radio notifications were known as a
"Submarine Moving Haven", a small rectangular area surrounding the
sub, theoretically off limits to attacks by friendlies.
From Panama to Pearl the absence of enemy
activity in the region provided ample opportunities for routine crew training
and emergency drills. In contrast to Gunnel's first patrol in the Eastern
Atlantic in which reconnaisance and support of the allied invasion of North
Africa had been the main mission, in the Pacific the primary job of American
submarines -- generally operating as "lone wolves" -- was offensive
operations against the enemy, the destruction of enemy shipping, both warships
and merchantmen. Much of the training during the transit to Pearl was directed
to this end , with the crew frequently and at odd times called to "battle
stations" -- to bring everyone, including the Captain, into a high state
of readiness for combat, working as a team like a finely tuned watch.
The torpedomen shouldered a heavy
responsibility . Everyone knew that battles as well as the submarine itself
could be lost through torpedo failure. Training sessions, supplementing what
was learned at submarine school in New London, were held to insure every
torpedoman was qualified to independently conduct the required weekly
inspections, maintenance and technical tests of each torpedo to insure optimum
performance. Simulated combat training and firing drills were held daily.
Although only a few torpedoes were aboard for the transit, the normal war
complement of twenty four would be taken aboard at Pearl Harbor -- sixteen
torpedos in the forward torpedo room of which six were to be always "at
the ready" loaded in the six tubes, and eight in the after torpedo room
with four loaded in the tubes. "Fish", as they were affectionately
called, not carried in the tubes rested on "loading skids"in each
torpedo rooms, wooden cradles on heavy steel supports that could be shifted
laterally to line up with the tubes when reloads were required.
Shifting torpedos around was heavy physical
labor requiring several torpedomen to "mule haul" with blocks and
tackle to move them in and out of tubes, and laterally as well. Each torpedo
was over 21 feet long, weighed more than a ton including the nose cone which
was filled with several hundred pounds of TNT.
After minor repairs in Pearl Harbor and three
days of round the clock training and torpedo firing exercises conducted off
Oahu, the full complement of torpedo "war shots" was taken aboard.
Bunks were slung over torpedoes resting on the loading racks. Almost half of
the 70 enlisted men aboard were bunked in the two torpedo rooms, including
sailors from other departments as well as the torpedomen.
Gunnel got underway on May 28 and headed for
her assigned war patrol area, 4200 miles from Pearl Harbor in the East China
Sea, south of Korea and just west of Kyushu, the southernmost main island of
Japan. Enroute, a brief stop was made at Midway Island, 1100 miles northwest of
Oahu, to top off on fuel and fresh water, which would enable the submarine to
remain a few additional days in the patrol area.
The long voyage to enemy waters was never
dull for Gunnel’s hard working crew as recalled by former Chief Signalman Edwin
M. Leidholdt now living in Virginia Beach, Va:
"Each day, with monstrous
regularity we exercised at battle stations, gun drill, casualty procedures and
the loading and reloading of torpedo tubes. No longer were the men
"grousing" as they had done during long practice periods in Long
Island Sound before and after the first war patrol in the Atlantic. Now all
hands worked willingly. The devastation at Pearl Harbor had shocked us. The
sight of the blackened hulks had given us a sense of urgency, and we worked
together better than we ever had before. Even the ebullient Butova, the
brawling tough guy in our crew was newly subdued, his conversation no longer
limited to Rita Hayworth’s (a popular and steamy film actress) vital statistics
and the crew’s per capita consumption of beer during the last shore leave".
It wasn’t long before Ship’s Cook 2/c Frank
Butova of New London, Conn.became one of the most popular men in the crew, with
a reputation for his culinary skills. Good food was a distinctive hallmark of
the submarine service, a huge morale factor.
June 5, 1943, 2115 (M): Number two main engine stopped due to
broken tooth in main idler gear. This casualty is more or less of a repetition
of the trouble experienced off the coast of Europe in November 1942. Stoned teeth
down and engine ran for fourteen hours when two more teeth fell out. Secured
engine.
Number two main engine had been stopped when
an unusual rattling noise was heard in the engine. Subsequent inspection
revealed that one tooth from the main idler gear had broken off and bits were
mashed into the main drive gear. The engineers spent many hours opening the
gear boxes, removing the bits of metal and stoning the teeth down. Sorely
disappointed, but not surprised, Chiefs Murphy and Kaczur recalled that while
in the Portsmouth, N.H shipyard they had prophetically warned that merely
replacing the idler gears which had been directed by the Bureau of Ships and
the manufacturer would not resolve the problems. Since then, every submarine
powered by the HOR engines had experienced similar failures -- faulty engine
design was obviously the root of the problem.
June 8, 1835 (L): Sighted possible mast on the horizon. Went to maximum
speed on three main engines. Nothing further came of this contact.
2157: Sighted lighted plane flying flying low and apparently coming in
directly toward the submarine. Submerged.
2215: Surfaced and continued on base course
"By this time, Gunnel was within
range of air patrols operating from Japan. Prior to departing Pearl Harbor the
Captain had been briefed on the frequency and general pattern of air activity
to be expected within a few hundred miles of Japan, based on information gleaned from earlier sightings by
other American submarines as well as from intelligence reports." (Vasey)
June 10, 1825 (K): Sighted Tori Shima and closed to three miles. There
is apparently no activity on this island as it appeared to be completely
uninhabited.
"This small islet off the East
coast of Kyushyu was the first landfall since leaving Midway and the time of
sighting was almost precisely as predicted by Exec/Navigator Mel Dry. The
announcement over the loudspeaker generated a ripple of excitement through the
sub.
"Gunnel was cruising on the
surface at the time with one of the two periscopes raised to maximum height.
Surface contacts could be spotted about twice the distance as normally seen
from the bridge level. This technique was popular with most skippers as long as
the sea was calm; choppy seas could vibrate the scope and do serious damage to
the finely honed steel shaft which extended down through packing glands and the
conning tower housing. Because of its low silhouette, a submarine could usually
be maneuvered to stay out of visual range of most surface craft, with the
option of disappearing from sight when the skipper so chose.
"As Gunnel proceeded South, mostly
on the surface but with frequent dives to avoid fishing boats and other small
craft, patches of fog were routinely encountered." (Vasey)
June 12, 0933 (I): SD radar reported Yaku Shima at thirty-eight miles.
Proceeding down coast of Kyushu towards Kuchino Shima Suido.
"This unusually long reach of the
"surface search radar" -- 38 miles -- was no surprise. Chief Radarman
McSpadden of New London, Conn.was known as one of the best in the submarine
force. He treated his radars and other electronic gear with tender, loving
care; frequent inspections, maintenance and testing as if they were newborn
babes. Radars, periscope and sonars constituted the eyes and ears of a
submarine and could spell the difference between success or failure -- often
life or death." (Vasey)
1512: As visibility improved sighted Suwanose Jima, Nakano Shima and Kuchino
Shima.
" These were small islands in the
chain of Japanese islands known as Nansei Shoto running from Kyushyu, South to
Okinawa and beyond. It was a favorite fishing ground for small craft and also a
transit route for north-south shipping. Steamers could hug the coastal areas of
the islands making it difficult to spot them at night and to pick them out from
the "clutter" on a radar scope caused by the abundance of off- shore
rocks and islets in this region." (Vasey)
1545: Submerged.
1900: Surfaced, and at
2045: Entered area through Kuchino Shima. Took course towards southern part
of area with intention of working north toward Quelpart Island. From this time
on, many sampans were sighted both day and night. At night some were lighted
and others darkened. They were particularly large in numbers southwest of Danjo
Gunto. I submerged for a great number of these in the daytime in order to avoid
detection.
"The Captain has chosen Kuchino
Shima strait to make a night transit on the surface from the Pacific to the
East China Sea through the Nansei Shoto island chain. This channel was deep and
almost 4 miles wide, favorable conditions in case the sub had to make a sudden
dive to avoid detection. A submerged transit was feasible, but currents around
the island chain were tricky, often turbulent. Much greater speed could be made
while surfaced with better control of the maneuverability of the submarine. Of
course, being on the surface involved a higher probablity of detection and
attack by the enemy.
Quelpart -- called Cheju Do by the
Koreans who also claimed ownership -- was a large island at the south end of
the Korea Strait between Kyushu and the southern tip of the Korean peninula. It
was a good location to catch shipping transiting the Korea Strait as well as
traffic between Japan, Korea and China. Danjo Gunto was a group of small
islands off the western approaches to Nagasaki and the Sasebo naval base."
(Vasey)
June 14, 1410: SD radar contact. Submerged.
1640: Surfaced. Continued on course 000 degrees (T) closing Kyoban To and
Haku To in northern part of area. No navgational fix due to fog since we
entered area.
"Nor was it possible -- due to the
cloud cover and fog -- to use a sextant for navigational "fixes" on
the stars, moon or sun. There were no electronic aids or lighthouses beckoning
the Gunnel and it would be many years before satellite navigation was even
thought of. Ever since the passage through the island chain, navigation had
been by Dead Reckoning -- "DR" as commonly referred to by the
navigator and his super-efficient team of quartermasters. One or more were
always on duty checking courses, speeds, ocean currents, water depths --
plotting on a track chart the estimated submarine position for the Captain and
navigator's frequent examination. On rare occasions when the navigational
position of the submarine was in doubt, the Captain authorized use of the
fathometer(depth finder) to compare the plotted position with the depth of
water indicated on the navigational charts. But such soundings were rare -- the
sonar pings against the ocean floor could be heard by enemy ships in the
vicinity." (Vasey)
June 15, 1943, 0210: SJ radar contact bearing 060° (T), 18,000 yards.
Radar operator reported large size ship. Sounded battle stations and commenced
approach on surface. Visibility was betwen five and six hundred yards and at
times, less. The moon was setting.
"Excitement mounted as the crew
rushed to their assigned battle stations. This was the opportunity everyone had
been waiting for. Because of the limited visibility and position of the target,
the Captain had decided to remain on the surface and use the higher speed
available to maneuver into a good firing position. A night attack while on the
surface had become a favorite tactic of many skippers, although the risk of being
detected by planes and surface forces was substantially higher. At this time,
Gunnel was only a few miles south of the southern tip of Korea and 25 miles
north of Quelpart Island, a hornets nest of Japanese anti-submarine
forces." (Vasey)
0225: I picked up his dimmed fore light, which was very high, indicating a
large vessel.
"The word was passed that the
skipper was maneuvering the sub to fire a salvo of torpedos from the after
tubes. Adrenalin ran high in the after torpedo room crew led by TM1c Robert
D.Pickard of New London, Conn. and including Torpedoman Jim Lavelle from
Girardville, PA, as they eagerly anticipated being the first to launch warshots
from the Gunnel." (Vasey).
0230: Fired three torpedoes from stern tubes. Target on course 260° (T),
speed 12 knots. Torpedoes went out on 90 ° track at range of 1100 yards. Fired
at intervals of eight seconds
"At the command to fire, the
torpedo officer in he conning tower hit the plunger that activated the firing
system, and simultaneously Bob Pickard had his hand on another plunger mounted
on the tube itself, ready to fire by hand in case the electrical system didn’t
function. The first torpedo was launched with a jolting woosh and the submarine
shuddered as compressed air forced the fish out of the tube. Sea water
immediately flooded back into the tube, and the diving officer in the control
room had to angle the boat’s bow planes down to maintain an even keel. The
other torpedos followed, spread several degrees apart to bracket the target.
The torpedomen had their hands full, venting and blowing water out of the tubes
into the bilges, all the while a foggy haze of oily mist filled the torpedo
room.
"The sonar operator tracked the
course of the torpedos., listening to their propeller noises and high pitched
whine of the engines. ‘All hot, straight and normal’ he shouted, meaning that
each was speeding on its programmed course. The quartermaster counted the
seconds with a stop watch as each torpedo raced toward the target at 46 knots:
" …35, 36, 37, 38, 39". All hands listened with bated breath.
Suddenly,a loud explosion sending shock waves through the submarines hull
triggered a rousing cheer through the sub." (Vasey)
0230-40s: First torpedo hit apparently under the stern. Two
missed. Above explosion was followed by several minor explosions. Target
immediately opened fire with a five or six inch gun.
"The Captain had maneuvered the
submarine into a textbook firing position for a night surface attack -- abeam
of the target at optimum range and undetected. It was standard procedure to
fire a "spread"(fan) of torpedos rather than shoot at the same aiming
point in order to allow for possible errors in estimating target course and speed."
(Vasey).
0235: Swung bow around and at 700 yards fired one torpedo.
"One hit would
normally suffice to sink a freighter of this type but the skipper wanted to
make sure, and also was anxious to give the forward torpedo room gang a crack
at the target as well." -- (Vasey)
0235 - 28s: Torpedo hit after end of engineroom space. Gun was
silenced and crew abandoned ship in two boats. This hit was also followed by
several minor explosions. Closed ship to about 100 yards. She was down by the
stern and appeared to be sinking very slowly.
Raymond Lloyd a Battle Station Lookout on the bridge recalls "seeing some of the ships crew jumping over the side and one person climb up the mast and he kept climbing higher and higher as the ship continued to sink".
Ed Leidholdt manning his battle station
on the bridge at the time, remembers the dramatic scene that followed:
"Shortly afterward, a lifeboat full of survivors drifted within 15 feet of
our bow. No attempt to communicate was made by the occupants or by our crew,
and the lifeboat soon disappeared into the darkness."
0245: Took position to fire fifth torpedo from bow to expedite sinking of
freighter. Miss
0255: Fired sixth torpedo from stern. Missed.
0315: Fired seventh torpedo from bow. Miss. Between each of these firings I
closed range to about 50 to 100 yards to observe ship. Each inspection revealed
that she was lower in the water, particularly by the stern. I gave up and
cleared to await results, and, if necessary, use three inch gun. This was a
7000 to 8000 ton freighter, diesel engined, of the Mogamiawa Maru class (page
89, ONI 208J).
"War-time procedures specified
that torpedo shots be recorded as "hits" only if they exploded on
impact or under the target (triggered by the ship’s magnetic field). But this
rule unknowingly failed to take into account the faulty design and performance
of submarine torpedoes as later proven. For the first two plus years after
Pearl Harbor all skippers had complained of inherent problems of torpedo performance
beyond their control -- torpedos running 10 feet below the depth set on the
dial; faulty mechanical exploder mechanisms (the "fish" would
actually hit but not explode); magnetic exploders didn't work ("fish"
passing a few feet under the target’s steel bottom failed to explode as
designed to do); and even premature explosions before the torpedos reached the
target.
"Gunnel's experiences were no
exception. Although only one of the first three torpedos fired from the after
room was recorded as a "hit" the other two torpedo wakes, visible
frrom the rising bubbles of the "fish" (resembling a white chalk line
drawn on the surface of the sea) were clearly seen from the bridge as heading
straight and true to the target. Of the four fired from the forward room, only
one was recorded as a "hit" although the others were observed to head
straight for the freighter, at the time only 700 yards away and stopped
"dead in the water". (Vasey)
0330: Ship was definitely sinking. Entire after part was under water and bow
out.
0345: SJ Radar reported contact on three large ships at 22,000 yards. Took
one more look at freighter. Bow was out of water at angle of thirty degrees,
and water aft was up to second deck of center structure. At this time she was
visibly going down with increasing up angle so started approach on new radar
contact. It was now daylight with heavy fog, visibility 500 yards.
0347: Radar reported pip on sunken freighter completely gone.
Not mentioned in the official narrative
was the reloading of torpedo tubes ordered by the skipper shortly before
turning the submarine at high speed to head toward the three ships reported by
radar. During the swish-tailing maneuver, the sub heeled over at inopportune
moments for the men reloading torpedos in the forward room. Billy.J Stamperof
Springdale, Ark. picks up on the story:
"A torpedo got loose. We had
snubbed both ends of the 2000 pound "fish"but did not have a good
bite and the torpedo would slide port to starboard with a whip motion from the
choppy seas and the turns as the Captain maneuvered to get into the best
position. We had started to move the torpedo out to line it up with the tube. A
lurch caused the torpedo to slide by the latch. We finally got the chainfalls
on each end and were able to control the torpedo before it smacked another
'fish' or crushed one of the torpedomen. Reloading or moving torpedos in these
circumstances and any time during rough or heavy seas was extremely dangerous
and very terrifying."
0400: Determined that supposed three ships were Kyotan To, Daisanpu To, and
Haku To. Reversed course and headed for Danjo Gunto.
"Initially detected by radar at a
range of 11 miles, the blips on the radar scopes resembled three large ships in
formation.This area between the tip of the Korean peninsula and Quelpart island
is cluttered with small rocky islets. Even after the Gunnel’s tracking party
determined the contacts were stationary, the Captain wanted to continue closing
at full speed hoping they were ships at anchor, waiting to join a convoy.
"Finally, anticipating that
anti-submarine aircraft and patrol vessels from Quelpart would be out in full
force at daybreak searching for Gunnel near the scene of the recent sinking of
the freighter, he ordered maximum surface speed and set course toward Danjo Gunto,
100 miles to the southeast. This cluster of small islands commanded the
approaches to the busy industrial port of Nagasaki and the big Sasebo naval
base." ( Vasey)
0845: SD radar contact. Submerged.
"Radar reported the plane at 11
miles. It was observed through the periscope until out of range and showed no
indication of having detected the sub. Nonethess, being so close to enemy air
bases, the skipper thought it prudent to remain submerged for a few hours while
continuing to move to the southeast. " (Vasey)
1235: Surfaced.
1415: Sighted plane broad on starboard bow flying low. Submerged.
"The plane had been sighted by one
of the lookouts on the bridge and range estimated at five miles. It was closing
fast and low and headed straight for the sub. The Officer of the Deck shouted
"dive, dive" and pushed the diving alarm button which sounded a
raucous ‘AHOOGA, AHOOGA’ in every compartment of the submarine -- all the while
topside personnel scrambled to jump down the upper hatch, knowing that the
hatch cover must be closed in a matter of seconds before this part of the
submarine slid under water. It was the responsibility of the last man down the
hatch to pull the cover down firmly and spin the wheel on its underside,
extending out steel lugs which firmly sealed the cover in the closed
position."
"Such contacts and crash dives
were commonplace for all American submarines throughout World War II. There is
absolutely no doubt that well trained and alert crew members saved many a
submarine from devastating bombing attacks, depth charging and even
sinking." (Vasey)
1615: Surfaced.
1645: Sighted smoke on the horizon and headed for same.
1655: Picked up masts.
1700: Submerged and commenced approach on normal approach course. At this
time two stacks came into view (through the periscope) and, from smoke, ship
was making maximum speed.
1750: As visibility closed in, the ship took a course of about 220°(T).
1800: Surfaced and went to 17 knots on course 220°(T) to overtake
aforementioned ship.
1930: No contacts, visual, or radar, made, so slowed down and commenced
surface patrol. (while moving toward Danjo Gunto).
"Although always frustrating at
the time, contact situations were routinely encountered by submarines during
the war where the tactical picture was such that it was not feasible to close
the target and reach a firing position, even with the sub proceeding at high
speed. In this instance, the freighter had initially been detected at a range
of 20 miles on a course that would take it within torpedo firing range. But a
subsequent 55 degree change of base course headed the ship well outside the
parameter of a possible torpedo attack." (Vasey)
June 16, 1055: SD radar contact. Submerged.
"The contact was thought to be a
plane but may have been a fishing sampan. Numerous sampans were encountered
this day and on following days. It was crucial for the submarine to avoid
detection -- many such craft were known to be equipped with radio transmitters
manned by military personnel." (Vasey)
1301: Surfaced. It was a remarkably fine day in June as occurs every place
in this part of the world at this time of year. Visibility unlimited and a flat
calm. Danjo Gunto was clearly visible at twenty-five miles.
"While the Captain was chewing on
an unlit stogie he permitted some of the crew to come topside in relays to chat
with him and enjoy the beautiful day for a few minutes. Engineers especially
appreciated these opportunities to get away from the confined engineering
spaces and the constant loud clanging noises of the big diesel engines."
(Vasey)
June 17: Made submerged approach on Saishu To (Quelpart Island
) for a fix.
"Earlier, after 36 hours with no
good targets in sight or on the radar scope, the skipper had decided Gunnel
should move West toward Quelpart island again. Remaining too long in one
vicinity, especially in the approaches to a major naval base such as Sasebo,
multiplied the probability of being detected. The enemy would then route
convoys around the suspected submarine and mount a sustained air and surface
attack on the sub. A cat and mouse game – it was a constant battle of the
wits." (Vasey)
1108: Sighted eastern end of the island and took course to close Kyobun To.
"Although Gunnel remained
submerged during the remainder of daylight hours, the Captain occasionally
ordered the boat to "plane up" with conning tower partially out of
water for a better look at the island through a periscope and to make a quick
360 degree visual and radar sweep around the area, hoping to detect potential
targets." (Vasey)
2300: SJ radar picked up Haku To at 19000 yards bearing 030°(T)
"Haku To was a lighthouse on the
southern tip of the Korean archipelago. The light itself was not illuminated at
the time, but was known to operate intermittently at reduced power. Gunnel
spent the next several hours looking at other lighthouses and small islands
between the archipelago and Quelpart island -- believed to be navigational
points of reference used by merchant ships. Captain McCain reasoned that
shipping routes between China and Japan -- especially the large industrial port
of Nagaski on the western side of Kyushyu -- passed just to the north and south
of Quelpart within visual range of lighthouses on the island and some of the
nearby islets." (Vasey)
June 18, 0150: Sighted small darkened ship, apparently patrol vessel
bearing 000 degrees (T), distance 7000 yards. Night was very light even though
overcast. Changed course to avoid and commenced patrol along traffic lane,
courses 250 to 070 degrees (T). At this time intercepted radio transmission on
450kcs.
"This contact was about 15 miles
northeast of Quelpart, a logical location for patrol vessels to loiter, knowing
that American submarines would be attracted like a magnet to the shipping
routes in the vicinity of Quelpart. But it was also an area under constant
surveillance by air patrols flying from fields on Quelpart, and by
anti-submarine forces operating from the big naval base of Sasebo near
Nagaski." (Vasey)
0240: Radar contact on small patrol vessel. Changed course to avoid.
"Gunnel's radar was used
sparingly, and then only for fleeting sweeps -- it was known that Japanese
counter-measures equipment could detect the presence of American radars."
(Vasey)
0300: Sighted green flare bearing 120°(T). From the above it was evident that
there were several patrol vessels working in this section. As previously
stated, visibility was good. I changed course to 180°(T) for Danjo Gunto. This
spot was very close to the original sinking two nights before.
1830: Sighted Me Shima (on Danjo Gunto) bearing 160°(T).
1835 Sighted ship bearing 190°(T).
1837: Submerged. While trying to close this target, looked astern and picked
up the mast of a high stacked freighter. I lost the first target so decided to
make approach on this one.
1915: Sighted masts and stacks of five other ships drawing to westward.
Battle stations, normal approach course, and attempted to close before dark.
1930: Second sighting turned out to be seven large freighters and two small
ones, possibly patrol vessels.
2000: Became apparent that it would be impossible to close. I then came to
course 180°(T) to open out with the intention of surfacing and getting ahead of
column during night. Heard pinging (sonar) from ship in stern of column but was
unable to determine in fading light what type of ship it was. These ships, all
nine, were smoking heavily and making maximum speed. They were changing course
about every ten minutes through zigs of forty to sixty degrees. A plot showed
them to be on a base course of 260°(T), headed for Shanghai.
2055: Surfaced and got ready on three main engines, maximum speed 17 knots.
"With only three of the four main
engines operable since June 5, maximum surface speed was limited to 17 knots,
almost 4 knots below normal. Speed was often critical in chasing a target. In
this instance the Captain intended to stay on the surface and track the convoy
as it moved westward during the night, get ahead, and at daybreak make a
submerged attack." (Vasey)
2130: Sighted two unlighted sampans or
patrol vessels on port bow so changed to northwesterly course. Range of
visibility for large ships, 15,000 to 16,000 yards.
2150: Sighted convoy again and steamed
for two hours on parallel course to get ahead.
2350: Came to course 260°(T) making 17 knots.
June 19, 1943, 0040: Changed course to 270° The convoy was no longer in
sight.
0400: Started surface patrol on courses north and south.
0525: SD Radar contact on plane, 8 miles, forced the submarine down.
Commenced patrol at periscope depth.
"The Gunnel at this time was south
of Quelpart island, in a good position according to Exec/Navigator Mel Dry, to
attack the approaching convoy which he estimated would soon be in this vicnity
enroute Shanghai.The patrol plane was thought to be searching and
"sanitizing" the area 20 or so miles ahead of the convoy’s projected
path." (Vasey)
0629: The Executive Officer suggested we come up and resume surface patrol,
which I did.
"With no contacts by periscope or
sonar, Mel Dry was getting ‘antsy’. By his estimates the convoy must be in the
vicinity and he was worried it could slip by out of torpedo reach. While submerged,
periscope visibility was limited to about 4 miles. He urged the skipper to
bring the submarine to the surface for a brief period, and accept the risk of
being sighted .The range of visibility then would be much greater, and a quick
sweep with the radar could detect contacts just over the horizon. Subsequent
events confirmed the Exec’s prognosis." (Vasey)
0630: Surfaced; no planes
0631: Sighted convoy bearing 030°(T) coming over the
horizon.
0632: Submerged and came to normal approach course; proceeded to close range.
0645: The convoy was to the north of the anticipated position. In order to
close I went to full for 17 minutes, slowing down and taking periscope
observations every five minutes. I counted the same number of ships, either
masts or actual hulls. They were not smoking and were making less speed (7 1/2
to 9 knots). This convoy was still making 40 to 50 degree zigs. The closest
ship was a small freighter or trawler, apparently an escort, estimated to pass
1,000 yards ahead.
0820: I was as close as I was going to get and they were about seven minutes
on a left zig. I decided to pick two targets, and possibly a third for stern
tubes, and fire.There were nine ships in this convoy, two of which were
undoubtedly escorts. The remaining seven were old large coal burning freighters
of seven to eight thousand tons, travelling light. They were roughly in a
haphazard, staggered formation.
Ed Leidholdt, speaking to a high school
audience a few years after the war, recalled the exciting events that followed:
"The voice of our captain came
over the intercom: ‘Periscope depth sixty-five feet. We will fire three
torpedoes at the first freighter and three at the second.’ We increased speed
to give the bow and stern planes more holding power as the torpedoes were fired.
From the conning tower our captain spoke again: ‘This is the firing bearing;
when set, fire!’ The final periscope bearing was taken, and three torpedoes
were fired at the first freighter."
0822-29s: Fired three torpedoes at old freighter, 7,000 to 8,000
tons, estimated similar to Seiwa Maru (page 161, ONI 208-J), track 115°, range
2,500 yards. A longitudinal spread was used, one-quarter ship length ahead,
middle of target, and one quarter ship length astern.
0823-15s: Fired three remaining bow tubes at second freighter,
identified as Dakar Maru type (page 185, ONI 208-J). All six torpedoes left
blue smoke tracks. Sea was choppy with no swell, due to northwesterly breeze
that sprung up at dawn. Visibility was excellent.
" The Captain again quickly raised
and lowered the periscope" recalled Leidholdt "and fed the second
freighter’s bearing into the computer. ‘The torpedoes are leaving a blue smoke
screen’ he said. 'The Nips know the exact position we fired from.’
"Our ears popped as the air in the
torpedo tubes was vented back into the submarine," Leidholdt recalled.
" We waited patiently as the the count-down on each of the six torpedoes
neared zero, then there resounded , one after the other, three distinct
explosions."
0824-45s: Heard third torpedo of first salvo hit, and swung
periscope to look. This torpedo apparently exploded under the keel of ship at
point halfway between stern and MOT, because stern disappeared in a matter of
moments, while forward part, though floating, was settling fast. This old ship
undoubtedly sank within a few minutes. Sound reported pinging close aboard so
ordered 120 feet. We had some difficulty in getting down due to marked
temperature gradient.
" ’Captain’ the sonar operator had
broken in urgently, tugging at his pants leg.‘Fast screws bearing one-six-oh.’
The captain quickly swung the periscope to the bearing, and in rapid succession
barked the commands. ‘All ahead full! Hard dive, go deep! Rig for depth
charge!’ He turned to us, ‘Destroyer coming in fast about five hundred
yards." (Leidholdt)
0827-33s: Definite torpedo explosion. Overlapping and
approximately two thousand yards on the other side of second ship fired at was
a similar ship. If this torpedo exploded under this third ship, it meant that
it had run its maximum distance. We were still at eighty feet, going down
slowly.
0830: First depth charge of seven were dropped, each one closer than the
preceeding. Note: This was the first depth charge
attack many of the crew had experienced.
"Slowly our rate of descent
increased. We were at 150 feet when the destroyer passed overhead, the noise of
her screws sounding like the chugging of a fast freight train on a bridge. The
exploding depth charges almost deafened us. They extinguished our main lighting
circuit, and one by one our emergency battle lanterns were switched on.The
helmsman had just reported that the gyro-compass was inoperative and he was
shifting to magnetic compass, when from the control room the diving officer
shouted , ‘Can’t hold her down, sir; we’re broaching! The depth charges had
exploded under us, knocking out the bow and stern planes, forcing us toward the
surface.
"The Captain ordered the safety
tank flooded. For what seemed like minutes (seconds actually), the depth-gauge
needle vacillated at twenty-five feet; then slowly we started to descend, the
momentum of our dive increasing at fifty feet.We had just leveled off at 150
feet when the next attack came. Our submarine jarred at the shock of each
exploding depth charge, and Catholic members of the crews dropped to their
knees in prayer. Protestants also bowed their heads." (Leidholdt)
0849: Submarine was at 150 feet
when last charge went off close aboard. Commenced evasive tactics. We could not
hear any screws due to poor sound conditions, however, we did hear pinging, and
I always endeavored to keep it on the stern.
"The Captain ordered ‘silent
running’. We stripped ourselves of shoes, belts, and key rings and secured all
operating machinery. Our planes, rudder and sound gear we began to operate
manually, relieving stations periodically. Although underwater sound conditions
were poor, by sonar we tracked each attacking ship by its pinging sonar, and
when a destroyer speeded up for a run, we increased our speed and turned sharply
to avoid her path. So well did the enemy ships have us plotted that once we
actually heard the scraping of a grapnel hook against our hull."
(Leidholdt)
0900: While still at 150 feet a grapnel or chain rattled slowly and
excruciatingly down the port side. (I imagine the chains of Morley's Ghost
sounded very much like that to old Scrooge). That was enough. I ordered 300
feet and ran at that depth for four hours while he alternately ranged closer
and further away. While in the conning tower I heard him pass directly overhead
twice.
"Water depths in this area weren’t
much deeper than 300 feet and the Exec/Navigator pointed out that the
navigational chart showed at least one sea mount rising above the ocean floor.
But the skipper thought our best chance to avoid another grapnel encounter was
to run close to the bottom for awhile.
"One or more destroyers remained
in the vicinity, searching for us. When they were close, the incessant pinging
of their sonars could be distinctly heard through the hull. Finally, after a
prolonged period of silence we thought the enemy had lost contact. Both torpedo
rooms requested permission to temporarily close the outer doors of the torpedo
tubes in sequence, to partially retract the topedos from the tubes for a quick
inspection for damage. This was normal procedure after depth charge attacks. As
suspected by the torpedo gang in the after room, the "gyro pots" of
two torpedos were flooded, which meant the gyroscopes for steering the
"fish" were useless. The word was passed that only two torpedos could
be fired from aft." (Vasey)
Hearing the chains running down the GUNNEL's hull reminded Marty Kirwan of an incident that took place in Pearl Harbor prior to departure on this patrol.
(Kirwan)
Jim Lavelle and I completed our basic submarine training at New London, Connecticut in May, 1943. We were then assigned to the submarine GUNNEL-SS-253.
We were both “green” sailors. As I recall, Jim came from Pennsylvania and I from Louisville, KY. Jim was a handsome, pleasant, well-developed young man. I weighed 125 pounds. We both lived in the after torpedo room. Jim was a torpedo man and I was an electrician’s mate. Needless to say, we lived in close quarters. Our racks were over the torpedoes. Just one event that may be of some interest to you.
As you know, there are many written and unwritten ruses and regulations concerning proper naval procedures that guide the enlisted personnel in their daily activities. (Rocks & shoals). We were neophytes in our knowledge of the complexities of these rules and regulations. But, one thing we did know-if an officer suggested that you do something-you did it promptly! No questions asked. We had just left New London, CT several days prior and had arrived in Panama. I believe we spent several hot and humid days there before going through the Panama Canal. We then proceeded to Pearl Harbor. I believe we arrived there about May 18, 1943. When we arrived at Pear Harbor, we had to unload pieces of miscellaneous equipment. Jim and I were standing on deck in our work clothes, watching the officers exit the GUNNEL. A large bundle of officer’s clothing was on deck ready to be sent ashore to be cleaned. Ensign Robinson, an Annapolis Graduate, told us to take the bundle of clothes to the dock. The level of the dock was about 3 feet above the height of the deck, and about six feet away. Officers and other personnel were using the brow to be ashore. We being young, logical and totally unfamiliar with our limitations to toss the bundle of clothing on to the dock, decide that we could do the job easily. “One, two, three” Jim called to me and then we tossed the bundle toward the dock. The load of officer’s clothes landed in the water of Pearl Harbor and sank out of sight into about 40 feet of water. After about 5 minutes of thought on our part and angry stares from the owners of the clothes, someone suggested we get a long line and a grapnel hook to try to retrieve the clothes. In my lack of knowledge about the request, I asked someone to describe a grapnel hook. Well, to make a long story short we were able to use a line and grapnel hook to retrieve the clothes. It was amazing how easy it was to use the four-pronged hook to latch onto the blankets holding the clothes. We weren’t disciplined for out honest mistake, but I don’t think our stock went up in value with the officers.
I just wanted to mention this one random item to indicate an actual experience in our young lives. We didn’t think anymore about this experience, until that day when we were depth charged attacked-and then followed by a quiet interval. Then we did hear that metallic clanking sound outside, along the length of the GUNNEL. We remained submerged for more than 30 hours.
Even though we were on our first war patrol, Jim and I did not have to speculate about the capability and ultimate success of a well-placed grapnel hook. We knew from first had experience that our fate was in the hands of our guardian angels and god. I happened to be on watch in the maneuvering room at that time. As I recall, I said a perfect & sincere act-of-contrition, and continued to do my duty (operate the controllers) the rest of the watch.
We were submerged for an excessively long time period of time. I went off watch and tried to relax. We were operating for 4 hours on watch & 8 hours off watch.
When we surfaced after about 30 hours, I had to go forward and take electrolyte measurements on the two main power batteries. As we began to surface, I opened the watertight door to the after engine room. At the same time the main engine air induction value was opened. The 3 main engines started-up simultaneously, a whooosh sound was made as the watertight door was pulled inward. My hand was on the handle and I was pulled forward and smashed my upper lip on a steel doorframe. I tried to spit out my front teeth, but nothing happened. I proceeded to take the electrolyte readings and returned to the maneuvering room. I asked to be relived for about 15 minutes so that I could wash the blood out of my mouth. I then asked if I could lie down for 15 minutes to rest and compose myself. I fell asleep and when I woke, was told that I had slept for many hours. It was now my time to go back on watch. Yes, I remember it well!
"(Kirwan)
1430: After one hour of silence came to periscope depth to discover him on
starboard beam at range of 3,000 yards, apparently patrolling east on various
courses. Immediately returned to 300 feet and changed course to 000°(T). During
this time the submarine was heavy over-all due to the amount of water that was
necessarily flooded in to get down to this depth. The temperature gradient was
about 10 degrees. The heavy condition necessitated blowing and venting of
safety plus a combination of one-third and two thirds speed.
"Several hours later, our sonar
operators reported that the immediate area seemed clear of propeller noises and
of the ‘pings’ of enemy sonars. We used the last power remaining in our
batteries to surface. After surfacing, the sound of the engines charging the
battery and of the pumps clearing out the flooded bilges raised our spirits
tremendously." (Leidholdt)
2050: Surfaced in a bright moonlight night with no clouds in the sky. Sea
was practically a flat calm. The battery was low due to the high speed running
on the morning approach and the air banks were much depleted. Due to leak in
gland of cable in conning tower there was water in pump room over the floor
plates. This grounded out one air compressor motor and the air conditioning
plant. Also, water running down from the control room deck grounded out the
contact panels for the turbo-blows. Immediately started charge on two main
engines and put third on propulsion. Came to course 157°(T) which took us close
to the location of the morning sinking and also into southwest portion of area
nine where I intended to work over the auxiliaries, etc.
"But the rising water in the pump
room had reached a critical stage" recalled Leidholdt. "The Captain
himself went aft to the maneuvering room and called the electricians together.
Someone was needed to go topside and undertake the task of crawling on his
stomach a considerable distance along the pressure hull, climbing up under the
conning tower, and attempting to repair the packing gland that had sprung a
leak. The Captain described the risk involved, explaining that in case of
attack, it might not be possible for a repairman to escape. He then asked for a
volunteer.
"Chief Electrician’s Mate Edward
J. Podboy of Philadelphia, Pa. immediately stepped forward, asserting that he
was the person best qualified for the job. He gathered the equipment he would
need and went with the Captain to the bridge, where a plan was devised to make
Podboy’s mission as safe as possible. Ed Leidholdt would, while assisting with
the bridge watch, lean over the starboard railing where Podboy could make out
his silhouette in the darkness. Disappearance of the silhouette would signal to
Podboy that he must get back as quickly as possible.
"Perhaps a quarter of an hour into
Podboy’s mission, a lookout spotted a ship. The Captain called to me, ‘Come
over here and take a look at this.’ I looked through my binoculars and
reported, ‘It’s a destroyer.’ ‘The hell its is’ the Captain said, ‘it’s an AK
(cargo ship) and we’re going to sink it!’ I yelled to warn Podboy, but he had
already completed his mission and returned safely below."(Leidholdt)
2130: SJ radar contact at 5,800 yards immediately picked up by lookout. This
later turned out to be old destroyer so painted as to be very difficult to
distinguish at that range in the moonlight. I immediately put him on the stern,
went to battle stations, and got two after tubes ready for firing. All engines
were put on the line and speed increased to eighteen knots by pit log.
2135: Despite speed, range was closing rapidly.
2140: At a range of 3,000 yards I identified this vessel as an old type
destroyer (Wakatake class, page 82, ONI 14). He was making between 25 and 30
knots, changing course from thirty or forty degrees on one side to thirty or
forty on the other, closing my stern. I cleared the bridge with the exception
of the quartermaster (Ed Leidholdt) and myself.
2142: Destroyer opened fire with forward gun using after guns when they
bore. He was firing fused projectiles and they passed over and on either side.
"We then sighted a second
destroyer steaming in column behind the first, and a third one dead astern of
us. It would be impossible to turn to fire at the other two. All of the
destroyers were now shooting at us. " (Leidholdt).
2149: Range appeared to be 1500 to 1800 yards through binoculars, 2,000 by
SJ and generated TDC. Shots were getting uncomfortably close and angle on the
bow was ten degrees starboard, with the destroyer swinging right rapidly
(approximately one degree per second)
2150: Entered final bearing and fired using one degree spread. Sounded
diving alarm and closed hatch.
"As Torpedo Officer, I was in the
conning tower frantically working out a firing solution on the Torpedo Data
Computer (TDC). The Captain on the bridge with Ed Leidholdt at his side was
sending me frequent estimates of the enemy's course changes, bearing and speed.
Chief McSpadden in the conning tower was reporting radar ranges. The Captain
ordered me to fire all four stern tubes when I had a good computer solution,
but seconds later yelled excitedly in salty language, 'Shoot Joe, fire those
blankety blank torpedoes before Ed and I are blown away by shrapnel.' I fired
the two operational torpedoes in the stern tubes – "down the throat",
with a small spread, enemy speed set at 30 knots. The depth setting on the
'fish' had been set to explode as the torpedos passed through the ship's
magnetic field, three feet beneath the bottom. Thank the Lord the magnetic
detonating mechanism worked as designed -- otherwise I wouldn't be telling this
story."(Vasey)
2150-42s: First torpedo hit when submarine was still at 35
feet. Due to some confusion on the bow planes they were not rigged out
properly.
2151: Approximately five depth charges went off nearly simultaneiusly
astern. Submarine was then at forty feet and the pip (of the target)
disappeared entirely from the SJ.
"The awesome sounds of exploding
depth charges and collapsing bulkheads as the warship rapidly sank close astern
of Gunnel was an unforgettable experience for all hands." (Vasey)
This painting, based on recollections of GUNNEL crewmen shortly
after the engagement, depicts the sinking of the Japanese destroyer on the
night of June 19th.
2152: Leveled off at 200 feet. When still undecided as to what to do, sound
reported at
2157: pinging at a distance forward of starboard beam and getting closer.
2158: Sound reported pinging forward of the port beam. These were two of the
three destroyers (including the one sunk) that were probably sent out from
Sasebo. Commenced evasive tactics at 300 feet.
2259: A pattern of eight depth charges were dropped well astern.
June 20, 1943, 0100(I): Last of pinging.
0307: Surfaced and commenced air and battery charge. By this time air and
battery were really low.
0340: Sighted my two friends ahead, range 7,000 yards, signalling to each
other. By this time a combination of dawn and moonlight made visibility even
better. Managed to charge batteries for 20 minutes at 3,000 amps aside.
Repaired badly leaking cable stuffing-box from outside of conning tower.
"The short period on the surface
had provided our first good opportunity to assess the damage from the last
barrage of depth charges. The bow and stern planes, the gyro-compass, and
several minor leaks could be repaired, we found; but one of the packing glands
had again been sprung and while submerged we were unable to stop a steady
squirting of water across the conning tower. To prevent flooding of the conning
tower by the water which was coming in with great force, we had opened the
drain line to the pump room bilges. This measure could soon have flooded the
pumping equipment, and there was additional concern that the weight of the
water might hinder us in maintaining depth control. Podboy again rose to the
occasion and went topside to fix the leak in the packing gland."
(Leidholdt)
0341: Submerged and went to course 230°(T). We were now thirty miles south
of Saishu To (Quelpart Island) which has a nearby air station on the western
end. As daylight had already started and the area must have been under constant
air surveillance, I ran submerged for the rest of the day with all auxiliaries,
etc., cut out.
1400: Commenced running at periscope depth.
"For the remainder of the day
until evening the two destroyers remained in the general vicinity searching for
Gunnel, but failed to establish a postive sonar contact. Obviously they were
determined to hang on like bull dogs , knowing that eventually we must
surface."(Vasey)
2030 (approximately):
"The skipper called the officers and chiefs to the wardroom to review the
condition of the boat and crew. Chief Podboy gave a grim assessment of
propulsion power remaining -- at most, only 30-60 minutes of battery life left.
Chief Renner said the crew were exhausted, foul air getting worse made
breathing increasingly difficult.The carbon dioxide absorbent and reserve air
flasks were used up. Temperatures in the boat were over 120 degrees, and
humidity 100 percent. Chief Pharmacist Mate "Doc" Williams said most
of the crew were physically and emotionally drained.
The Captain then described his
intention:
Gunnel would be eased to the surface
quietly so the blowing of main ballast tanks by high pressure air would not be
heard by enemy sonars. The five inch, 20mm and machine guns would be quickly manned
and made ready for a shoot-out with the warships. Although the ships had not
been detected recently by Gunnel's sonarmen, he assumed they were loitering on
the horizon ready to close in for a kill once the sub was detected on the
surface.
"But there was another option. He
was dead set against it, but wanted to mention it in case there was not
unanimous support for his intended course of action . All classified equipment
and materials would be destroyed, then the Gunnel brought to the surface and scuttled
by opening sea and vent valves. All hands would jump into the sea, hoping to be
rescued and not shot. There was no discussion -- only a simultaneous shout:
‘let's get going skipper and give it to those b_____s! " (Vasey)
"The skipper immediately ordered,
‘Prepare for battle surface!’ The order was repeated throughout be boat. He
then gave the order to ‘plane up’, to run with decks awash, and when a
subsequent periscope and radar sweep of the horizon reported all clear, the
surfacing order was given. He directed that only Ed Leidholdt and I go to the
bridge with him, first priority to scan the horizon with binoculars and then I
was to get the gun crews topside as rapidly as possible, even with sea water
still sloshing across the main deck. As Ed pushed open the upper conning tower
hatch and the three of us scrambled to the bridge, the fresh air was
overwhelming – the contrast with the foul air below caused us to black out
momentarily. I remember slumping to the deck but soon reviving, still clutching
the sub-machine gun I had carried up from below. Then, I grabbed the binoculars
hanging around my neck and on the second sweep of the horizon, spotted the two
warships at a distance forward of our beam, fortunately headed away from us
into a patch of fog.
"The word was passed below, and
there was a collective sigh of relief – none of us cherished the thought of a
gun battle with two destroyers. Then, the skipper ordered the diesel engines
started to recharge batteries and suck fresh air into the boat -- the answer to
everyone’s prayers. By this time, there were no non-believers aboard Gunnel.
The Captain's official notation follows:" (Vasey)
2045: Surfaced. Gravity 1120 and very little air left, commenced charge and
steamed on course 180°(T). I was as far as forty-eight miles inside SCORPION's
area and had been since chasing the convoy into area twelve. Continued on
various courses to clear area and get into southwestern portion of own
assignment. We had been down 36 hours with the exception of 2 breaks (totaling
one hour and thirty-four minutes). This entry is
very understated. Although you wouldn't know it from the tone of this entry,
the Gunnel had survived several close calls, sank a destroyer and finally
endured being submerged for over 34 hours in a 36 hour period. Please remember
that auxiliaries had been cut off to conserve energy meaning there was no air
conditioning, etc. The air gets very foul aboard these submarines even under
circumstances much less trying than these. This was an extremely difficult time
for all aboard.
Charles E. Napier's
recollections of this incident.
******* (Click above to read the dramatic
impressions of this 36 hour ordeal by a young sailor from Muskogee, Oklahoma)
*******
2115: Received message stating that SCORPION would arrive in that area
"The message was received via one
of the routine daily radio broadcasts sent from Pearl Harbor to all submarines
on war patrol.It was merely an advisory that SCORPION was enroute to an adjoining
patrol area and left it to the judgement of the two submarine skippers to stay
out of each other's way. In World War II there was no effective means of
secure, submarine to submarine communications." (Vasey)
June 21, 1943, 1000: Inspected gears of number three main engine and found
half of tooth in main idler gear gone. A casualty of this sort is one in which
there is no expedient whereby the deficiency can be corrected. Once the timing
gears go the engine is completely inoperative, and in vessels equipped with
H.O.R. engines the Winton auxiliary steps into a prominence heretofore
unexperienced in our submarine force. Two engines left showed noticeable wear,
and, due to the indefinite length of time that these gears would last, decided
to clear the area.
"Ever since the breakown of number
two main engine on June 5, the same recurring problems with the other three
engines kept the engineers laboring night and day nursing them along. The
routine was repetitious -– teeth on the main idler gears would chip and
eventually break off and bits were mashed into the main drive gear and upper
idler gears. Each time, the affected engine would be stopped for several hours
while the engineers "dressed up" (honed) the damaged teeth, rotated
the gears to remove the steel chips and retest the engine. Eventually the
damaged gear teeth and noisy gears created a "no-win" situation.
"The skipper’s decision to end the
patrol was heartbreaking for him, and for all of us. Gunnel’s crew were at peak
performance, precision teamwork and an aggressive spirit with a will to win.
But there was absolutely no alternative. The harrowing experiences of the first
war patrol after all four main engines broke down when Gunnel was West of Spain
in U-boat infested waters was a sobering reminder that good luck has it’s
limits. " (Vasey)
June 22, 1943, 0900 (I): Departed area via Kuchino Shima Suido and headed for
Midway.
June 23, 0650: Sighted twin-engined bomber on converging course,
distance five miles. Submerged.
0812: Picked-up patrol vessel, by periscope and sound. Avoided.
1140: Surfaced.
"The remainder of the trip to
Midway was uneventful, giving the crew some time for rest and reflection.
Leidholdt summed it all up when he wrote after the war: "In the control
room enroute to base, we sipped from mugs of steaming coffee and reviewed the
demanding challenges and dangers experienced during the patrol. We felt new
confidence in ourselves and in our submarine. Moreover, some of us had emerged
from our first war patrol against Japanese forces with new insights into
ourselves.
"‘Well, Butova’ said the Captain
to our most colorful sailor, ‘What do you think?’ Butova looked
uncharacteristically thoughtful. ‘Captain’, he replied at last, ‘I used to
think that I was a brave bastard; but now I know I’m just a yellow
S.O.B.!’ " (Leidholdt)
July 3, 1943, 0900 (Y): Arrived Midway Island.
As GUNNEL approached the pier at
Midway, a grim reminder of our near fatal encounter with one of the depth
charge attacks during this patrol was recalled in later years by Bill Stamper
who was a line handler standing on the forward port deck:
“We had left our mooring lines at
Midway before leaving on this patrol (a standard practice). When we arrived
back at Midway, a whaleboat met us to return our mooring lines before we
reached the pier. I was in charge of #1
mooring line and standing by to receive the first heaving line thrown at us
from the whaleboat. It landed with the Monkey Fist going straight through a
gaping, jagged hole in the deck, about 3 x 4 feet. As we tried to reach it, I
slipped and hit the shin of my right leg on the jagged edges of wood. Hurt is
not the right word but we went ahead with securing the lines so we could go to
the pier. I believe the sea was just a bit choppy. It took me two months to
heal after the doctor removed the huge clot.”
"Mail call! " was excitedly
shouted throughout the sub as topside personnel sighted sacks of mail on the
dock waiting for Gunnel’s crew. The hardships and dangers of the past several
weeks quickly evaporated as all hands eagerly anticipated hearing from wives,
families, sweethearts and friends.
"A humorist – one of several in the
crew – had sketched the above "Gooneyville Pass" and posted it on the
bulletin board: a mock liberty card for going ashore in Midway. But there was
no opportunity for shore leave here. A group of engine "experts"
flown out from the US quickly concluded that Gunnel should be sent to Mare
Island Shipyard near Vallejo California to have all four main diesel engines
removed and replaced with the highly reliable General Motors diesels used by
many other submarines. The decison was a wise one -- before Gunnel reached its
destination the third HOR diesel suffered the same casualty as the others,
leaving only one engine for propulsion." -- (Vasey)
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
subsequently commented in his official evaluation of GUNNEL's patrol:
"This second war patrol was the first made by GUNNEL in areas under the
operational control of Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. The
patrol was carried out in an extremely aggressive and successful manner.
In addition to normal hazards of patrolling in enemy waters the GUNNEL
was severely handicapped by poor engine performance and the patrol had
to be terminated early because of this feature.
" All attacks were carried out with careful but aggressive planning and
each attack resulted in inflicting damage to the enemy. Excellent judgment
was used throughout. The night attack on the enemy destroyer that was
attacking GUNNEL was extremely aggressive. ..
"The CommanderSubmarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding
officer, officers and crew for this highly aggressive and successful war
patrol carried out under trying conditions of faulty material. The Gunnel
is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:
In the captain's report he
writes the following about the GUNNEL's engines:
"Last,
but not least, H.O.R. engines. Reams have been written and there still is
material left for volumes more as regards the dubious trustworthiness of this
make of engine. The GUNNEL has been in commission eleven months and during that
period she has just been able to complete two military missions. The troubles
experienced are much more fundamental than gears, and, in the interests of
efficiency, new engines should be installed as soon as they become
available."
"The Auxiliary Cannon-Ball"
(Sung to the tune of
Wabash Cannon-Ball)
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When we left Midway, |
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We had four engines strong, |
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But three days out to sea, |
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We knew that that was wrong. |
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For there came a rumble, |
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A clatter and a thud, |
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And No. 2 Main Engine |
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Turned out to be a dud. |
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So listen to the rumble, |
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The rattle and the roar. |
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Listen to the engines of, |
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One, Three and Four. |
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Then as we neared the war zone, |
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Our hearts weren't full of glee, |
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Because we couldn't answer the "Start Bell", |
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On Engine No. Three. |
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But we could hear a rumble |
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A clatter and a roar, |
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And we knew that we were going ahead |
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On Engine No. Four. |
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So listen to the rumble |
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The rattle and the roar, |
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Listen to the rumble |
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Of Engines One and Four. |
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When we reached the war zone |
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And our patrol was halfway done, |
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We found that we were running |
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On Engine No. One. |
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Then there was a crashing |
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A rattle and a roar |
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And we found much to our sorrow |
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That is was Engine No. Four. |
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So Listen to that rumble |
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Our stand-by was in use, |
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And if the gear train goes on it |
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It will probably cook our goose. |
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When our patrol was ended |
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And the battle nearly won, |
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There came another crashing |
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And main engines we had none. |
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Now when you hear that purring |
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A purring sweet and clear, |
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You'll know it's from an engine |
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We all love so dear. |
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Now as we go eastward |
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Mare Island our Port Of Call, |
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If we see our mothers |
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It will be late this fall. |
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Now listen to that purring |
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The sweetest music of all, |
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And we'll give thanks to the Winton people, |
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For the Auxiliary Cannon-Ball |
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Composed by:
The After Engine Room
Gang
USS GUNNEL Log Book
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